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Charitable Remainder Trusts: 
A Study of Current Problems 
Anthon S .  Cannon, ~ r . *  
As anyone connected with the drafting or administration of charitable 
remainder trusts is painfully aware, an inordinately long and complex 
set of Treasury Regulations has been promulgated under section 664 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.t Moreover, in recent 
years the Internal Revenue Service has adopted a highly technical and 
rigid approach in its interpretation of the requirements of the statute 
and the regulations. The resulting confusion and uncertainty in this 
area of the law have caused many attorneys, including experts in the field, 
to avoid charitable remainder trusts whenever possible in creating estate 
plans for their clients. 
This article suggests that the extremely technical interpretive ap- 
proach currently pursued by the Service is unnecessary in circum- 
stances where it is clear that the interests of charity are not materially 
jeopardized, and contends that both the underlying purposes of the 1969 
reforms and the interests of the beneficiaries of section 664 trusts would 
be better served by a more realistic and flexible reading of the Code and 
regulations. The article begins with a synopsis of the basic requirements 
of the Code and the regulations relating to charitable remainder trusts, 
and presents an overview of the important administrative rulings re- 
cently issued by the Service. Various problems which are only now be- 
coming apparent to those involved with the administration of a section 
664 trust are then discussed, with special emphasis given to the prob- 
lems of administering unfunded charitable remainder trusts during the 
deferral period. The article concludes with a discussion of a recent com- 
mittee report by the Tax Section of the American Bar Association which 
considered some of the adverse tax consequences and inequities relating 
to the deferral period, and, in light of the present state of the case law, 
suggests that the statutory amendments proposed by the committee may 
be unnecessary. 
Charitable remainder trusts have long been a preferred method for 
conferring an economic benefit upon both charitable and noncharitable 
*B.S., University of Utah, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1965; LL.M. (Taxation), New 
York University, 197 1 .  Member, New York State Bar. 
The author acknowledges the valuable research and editorial assistance rendered by David 
K. Detton, class of '76, in the preparation of this article. 
?Hereinafter, all citations in the text and footnotes to sections of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954, as amended, will be by section number only, e.g., section 664. 
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beneficiaries. Prior to the enactment of the tax reforms of 1969, the 
benefits accruing to the grantor from such transfers in trust were sub- 
stantial. Income, estate, and gift tax deductions were allowed the 
grantor for the then present value of the charitable remainder interest in 
such a trust,' provided that the possibility of the trust principal being 
invaded for noncharitable purposes was sufficiently r e m ~ t e . ~  The 
grantor could reserve the income or a fixed amount from the trust assets 
to himself or a loved one, could bestow gifts on preferred charities, and 
could remove income subsequently earned by the transferred assets from 
his own gross income. The absence of any mandatory Treasury or In- 
ternal Revenue Service standards for such gifts in trust permitted the 
creation of a myriad variety of supplemental trust powers and clauses 
which ultimately resulted in abuses.3 
Such abuses prompted growing congressional concern that what was 
ultimately distributed to charity did not correspond to the value of the 
charitable deduction initially allowed. As a result, the Tax Reform Act 
of 19694 included new charitable income, estate, and gift tax laws dis- 
allowing deductions for a charitable remainder trust unless it qualifies 
as a charitable remainder annuity trust ("annuity trust") or a charitable 
remainder unitrust ("unitrust") within the definition of section 664.5 
In contrast to the law prior to 1 969, strict compliance with all of the re- 
quirements of section 664 is now necessary before the anticipated tax 
benefits may accrue to the grantor. 
'Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 487-89. For example, if all trust 
income was required to be paid to a named individual, the value of the charitable remainder 
interest was determined by applying certain Internal Revenue Service tables (based on incre- 
mental earnings of 31/2 percent) to the relevant payout period, i.e., a term of years or the life 
expectancy of the income beneficiary. 
2Commissioner v. Estate of Louis Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1954); Newton Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175 (1 st Cir. 1947); Treas. Reg. 00 1.170-1 (e) (1 972), 20.2055-2(b) 
(1974), 25.2522(a)-2(b) (1974); Rev. Rul. 143, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 247. 
3For example, a deduction was allowed even though the trust principal could be invaded 
for the benefit of the noncharitable beneficiaries or the charitable remainder interest could 
be defeated by a contingency, as long as such risks could be regarded as so remote as to be 
negligible. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); cf. Merchants Nat'l Bank 
v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943). Further, trust assets could be invested in speculative or 
high risk investments which enhanced current yield and maximized the amount distributable 
to the noncharitable income beneficiary while causing serious risk to the value of the re- 
mainder interest ultimately payable to charity. S. REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 
(1969). 
For an excellent discussion of the rules applicable to pre-1969 charitable remainder trusts 
see Taggart, Charitable Deductions for Transfers of Remaindel- Interests Subject to Inva- 
sion, 21 TAX L. &v. 535 (1966). 
For a discussion of the purposes underlying the Tax Reform Act of 1969 see U.S. TREASURY 
DEP'T TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 21,38 (Part l) ,  182-85, 190-93 (Part 2) (1969). 
4Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
5Sections 170(f)(2), 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2). Other than transfers to charitable remainder 
trusts, the Tax  Reform Act of 1969 permits a deduction for transfers to a pooled income 
fund described in section 642(c)(5), for gifts of a remainder interest in a personal residence 
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A. The Definition of Annuity Trusts and Unitrusts - Section 664(d) 
The charitable remainder trusts described in section 664 are divided 
into two categories, annuity trusts and unitrusts. The principal differ- 
ence between the two is that in an annuity trust a "sum certain (which is 
not less than 5% of the initial net fair market value of all property placed 
in trust)" is annually distributed to the noncharitable beneficiary where- 
as in a unitrust a "fixed percentage (which is not less than 5% of the net 
fair market value of [the trust's] assets, valued annually)" is distributed 
to the noncharitable beneficiary.6 
An annuity trust assures the donor that a certain dollar amount will 
be distributed annually to the noncharitable beneficiary, irrespective of 
fluctuations in the market value of the trust assets. However, the annual 
amount distributed under a unitrust will vary with any rise or fall in the 
market value of the trust assets.7 The amount payable to the noncharit- 
able beneficiary under a unitrust may also be defined in the trust agree- 
ment as the lesser of the fixed percentage of trust assets, described above, 
or farm, or for gifts of an undivided portion of the donor's entire interest in property. Treas. 
Reg. §§ 1.170A-7 (1972), 20.2055-2(e)(2) (1974), 25.2522(c)-3 (1974). The limited nature of 
these exceptions demonstrates the pervasive changes wrought by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
in split-interest charitable gifts. A discussion of these other forms of giving, however, is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
6Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(1), -3(a)(l) (1972). The requirement that a sum certain or a 
fixed percentage of no less than 5 percent be paid to the noncharitable beneficiary is arbi- 
trary and seemingly unnecessary. The apparent genesis of this rule was congressional con- 
cern that charitable remainder trusts would be used to circumvent the minimum income dis- 
tribution requirements imposed upon private foundations under section 4942, viz., that a 
minimum percentage of the assets held by charity or available for charitable uses be currently 
expended for such purposes. Because of the tax exempt status of section 664 trusts, Congress 
feared that by limiting the payout to the noncharitable beneficiary of such trusts, all income 
in excess of such amounts would be accumulated tax free. S. REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 90 (1969). There is little similarity, however, between the policy considerations under- 
lying the section 4942 payout requirement for amounts currently held by or available to 
charity and section 664 trusts which make assets available to charity only after the expiration 
of an intervening noncharitable interest. Moreover, a lesser payout in the case of a charitable 
remainder trust would increase the value of the remainder interest ultimately distributed 
to charity. 
Although the stated reason for the 5 percent minimum was avoidance of a theoretical, but 
highly unlikely, abuse, it is questionable whether the rigidity and highly arbitrary nature of 
the present cure is necessary, especially in light of its double chilling effect on charitable 
giving. First, a donor may not increase his charitable contribution (with its concomitant de- 
duction) by decreasing the percentage payout to the noncharitable interest below 5 percent. 
Second, instead of permitting any excess income to accumulate tax free, the 5 percent mini- 
mum distribution requirement results in current taxation of such income in the hands of the 
noncharitable beneficiary while depleting the total amount ultimately distributable to 
charity. The minimum distribution requirement, therefore, has the effect of increasing the 
government's income at the expense of charity. 
7The net fair market value of the trust assets is required to be computed each year. Treas. 
Reg. 8 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(a). For a discussion of net fair market value see notes 72-78 and accom- 
panying text infra. 
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or the actual income of the trust.* This alternative provision is only 
applicable to a unitrust, as an annuity trust with such a provision would 
be disqualified under section 664(d).9 
Section 664(d) imposes additional requirements upon both annuity 
trusts and unitrusts. No invasion of the charitable remainder interest, 
other than for authorized payments to the noncharitable interest, is per- 
mitted in either type of trust.lO Both types of trusts are required to pro- 
vide that upon termination of all noncharitable interests, the remainder 
interest must be "transferred to or for the use of, [a charitable] organiza- 
tion described in Section l7O(c)" or retained by the trust for such use." 
The noncharitable beneficiaries of these trusts may be "one or more 
persons" at least one of whom is not an organization described in section 
170(c), and if any beneficiary is an individual, he must be living at the 
time of the creation of the trust.12 Finally, the noncharitable interest may 
be paid either for a fixed term not to exceed 20 years or for the life or lives 
of the individual noncharitable beneficiaries, but may not be paid for 
any combination of the two? 
B. Other  Rules and Requirements of the Statute and Regulations 
The other subsections of section 664 comprise a highly unusual com- 
bination of new rules - rules which have produced a lengthy and intri- 
cate body of regulations. A grantor must satisfy all of these rules in creat- 
ing a charitable remainder trust or lose all tax benefits, since such rules 
are applicable notwithstanding other provisions of the Code.l4 Although 
other articles have discussed in detail the rules set forth in the regula- 
tions,l5 a few general remarks concerning some of the more important 
requirements applicable to both annuity trusts and unitrusts may be 
appropriate. 
These rules include the requirements that: (a) no trust provision may 
restrict the trustee from investing trust assets in a manner "which could 
result in the annual realization of a reasonable amount of income or gain 
from the sale or disposition of trust assets";16 (b) such trusts must "meet 
STreas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(b) (1 972). 
gTreas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(l)(i), -2(a)(l)(iii) (1972). See also H. R. REP. NO. 782, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess. 296 (Conf. Rep. 1969). 
loTreas. Reg. §§ 1.664-2(a)(4), -3(a)(4) (1 972). 
llTreas. Reg. $5  1.664-2(a)(6), -3(a)(6) (1972). 
12Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(3), -3(a)(3) (1972). 
l3Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(5), -3(a)(5) (1 972). 
'4Section 664(a). 
'5E.g., Seymour, Charitable Remainder Trusts, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 301 (1973); Sneed, Chari- 
table Remainder Trusts, 1973 U .  So. CAL. TAX INST. 87; Olsen and Ledwith, Charitable Re- 
mainder Trusts: How to Comply with Final Regulations, 38 J .  TAX 2 (1973); Teitell, Chari- 
table Remainder Unitrusts Under the T a x  Reform Act, 1 1  1 TRUSTS 8c ESTATES 859 (1972). 
16Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(a)(3) (1972). The meaning of the prohibition is not totally clear, 
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the definition of and function exclusively as a charitable remainder 
trust from the creation of the trust";17 and, (c) unless already pro- 
scribed by state law, the governing trust instrument must prohibit acts 
which would result in the imposition of any excise tax described in sec- 
tions 4941 through 4945.l8 Charitable remainder trusts are also exempt 
but it would appear to apply to express restrictions in the trust instrument which prohibit 
the trustee from selling certain assets, which require their retention under all or most all cir- 
cumstances, or which otherwise unreasonably limit the investment policy to be pursued by 
the trustee. However, the language of the prohibition does not require that a minimum 
amount of income, e.g., a minimum percentage of trust assets, be earned each year. I t  should 
be noted that such a standard based on the minimum distribution rules of section 4942 was 
considered by the Treasury and the Service, but was rejected because of the difficulties entailed 
in applying a single standard to the immense variety of factual settings in which section 664 
trusts arise. 
Although the regulations do not expressly forbid any particular types of investments for 
trust assets, in selecting an investment policy the trustee must consider state law requirements 
of fairness to all beneficiaries. For example, since the trust is tax exempt in order to protect 
the remainder interest from diminution, an investment in tax exempt securities will have to 
be justified on grounds other than their tax exempt character. In addition, because such 
investments clearly favor the noncharitable income beneficiary at the expense of the charitable 
remainderman, there is a substantial possibility that abuses in this area would cause the Ser- 
vice to prohibit all investments in tax exempt securities in conformity with the present restric- 
tions applicable to pooled income funds. Section 642(c)(5)(c). 
A related question is whether this regulation has established a federal rule of prudent 
fiduciary conduct or whether state law concepts will continue to be controlling in defining 
such phrases as "unwarranted restrictions" and "reasonable amount of income or gain." In  
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940), the Court described the relationship of federal 
and state law as applied to taxation as follows: "State law creates legal interests and rights. 
The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed." Id. 
at 80. Applying this standard in the present context, the better position would appear to be 
that state law concepts will continue to exert a substantial influence in evaluating the "pru- 
dence" of the trustee's investments. It should be noted, however, that since Commissioner v. 
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), only the decisions of the highest state court will be accepted as 
controlling pronouncements of state law. 
17Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-1(a)(4) (1972). A trust is deemed created at the earliest time that 
neither the grantor nor any other person is treated as the owner of the entire trust under the 
rules applicable to grantor trusts described in subpart E, part 1 of subchapter J ,  but "in no 
event prior to the time property is first transferred to the trust." Id. Thus, if grantor trust 
powers terminate with respect to a portion of the trust, but are retained over the remaining 
portion, the trust will not qualify because it will not have been a section 664 trust in its entirety 
from the moment created. Treas. Reg. 8 1.664-1(a)(6) (example 2) (1972). 
An important exception to this rule applies in the case of testamentary transfers in trust. 
In such cases, if the obligation to pay the annuity or unitrust amount begins on the date of the 
settlor's death, a charitable remainder trust is deemed created on such date even though the 
trust is not completely funded until a reasonable period has elapsed for administration of the 
estate or settlement of another terminating trust. Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(a)(5) (1972). See also 
notes 63-64 and accompanying text infra. 
Issection 508(e). Section 664 charitable remainder trusts constitute split-interest trusts with- 
in the meaning of section 4947(a)(2) and consequently are subject to certain of the private 
foundation rules, including the section 4941 prohibitions against self-dealing and the section 
4945 restrictions on taxable expenditures. However, a complete discussion of the effect of 
these rules on section 664 charitable trusts is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion 
of the basic requirements of these rules see Rev. Rul. 395, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 340, 343, 349; 
Rev. Rul. 74-368, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. NO. 30, at 17. The draftsman should also consult the 
provisions of the applicable state law to determine the effect of legislation enacted to comply 
with section 508(e), if any, on the language of the trust instrument. 
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from federal income taxes, unless the trust has unrelated taxable busi- 
ness income.19 An exclusive set of rules determines the amount and 
character of income to be recognized by the noncharitable beneficiary 
as the result of trust  distribution^.^^ Finally, section 664(e) provides 
rules for valuing the amount of the contribution deduction for a gift of a 
charitable remainder interest in trust, but it should be noted that other 
sections of the Code and not section 664 authorize the deduction.21 
Prior to 1974, only three published rulings had been issued since the 
publication of final  regulation^.^^ However, in 1974, eight rulings affect- 
ing section 664 trusts were issued - an indication that the problems 
presented by the complexity of the regulations are beginning to ~urface.~3 
A review of these recently published rulings is instructive in at least two 
respects. First, the issues confronted in the rulings are, for the most part, 
lgSection 664(c). For example, a trust will have unrelated business income if it receives 
income-producing property subject to a mortgage or other similar lien even if the trust is not 
personally liable for the obligation. Such property constitutes debt-financed property and all 
or a portion of the income from the property will constitute unrelated business income for 
purposes of sections 5 12 and 5 14. 
20Section 664(b). Taxation of distributions to noncharitable beneficiaries is not governed 
by the distributable net income rules generally applicable to trusts and estates, but rather by 
the special rules of Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(d) (1972), which require the trustee to maintain de- 
tailed records as to the amount and character of all income received by the trust as deter- 
mined at the end of each taxable year. Distributions of such amounts to noncharitable bene- 
ficiaries are deemed paid out of the following categories, first from assets includable in the 
current taxable year and then from prior years, in the following order: (1) as ordinary income 
without regard to the net operating loss deduction, since such losses are allowed both as 
carrybacks and unlimited carryforwards against ordinary inco,me (e.g., interest, dividends, 
royalties); (2) as capital gains determined on a net cumulative basis pursuant to special rules 
of the regulations (covering long- and short-term character) and without regard to the usual 
carryforward and carryback rules of section 1212; (3) as other income (e-g., tax-exempt interest); 
and (4) as corpus. Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(d)(2) (1972) stipulates that expenses directly attri- 
butable to an income class within a category reduce the amount of income therein, and that 
after such reductions, all other expenses not directly attributable to any income class are to 
be allocated among the classes within each category on the basis of the proportional gross 
income of each class. But in no event may a class of income be reduced below zero by reason 
of the allocation of expenses. If directly attributable expenses exceed the income of a class, 
the expenses are lost. Indirect expenses, however, would be reallocated to other classes of 
income. Finally, Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(d)(3) (1972) requires proration of the categories of 
income and corpus where distributions are made by the trust to two or more beneficiaries. 
*lTreas. Reg. $8 1.664-2(c), -2(d), -3(c), -3(d), -4 (1972). 
22Proposed Treasury Regulations under section 664 were initially issued on August 5, 1970 
(35 Fed. Reg. 12467), and reissued on September 18, 19'7 1 (36 Fed. Reg. 18667). Final regula- 
tions were published on August 23, 1972 in Treasury Decision 7202. TREAS. DEC. 7202, 1972-2 
CUM. BULL. 313. 
23As of AIarch 1, 1975. Three of these rulings are discussed in the text accompanying notes 
43-50 infia. T h e  other five rulings are: Rev. Rul. 39, 1974-1 CUM. BULL. 156; Rev. Rul. 53, 
1974-1 Cmr. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 149, 1974-1 CUM. BULL. 157; Rev. Rul. 283, 1974-1 CUM. BULL. 
157; and Rev. Rul. 74-368, 1974 INT. B v .  BULL. NO. 30, at 17. 
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questions of significance, and illustrate the type of narrow, complex 
issue which can be presented. Second, the rulings also demonstrate that 
the Service has adopted a highly technical approach to interpreting 
questions raised under the statute and regulations, and indicate that 
failure to meet all of these requirements will result in loss of the antici- 
pated tax benefits. 
A. Revenue Ruling 72-395 -Model Trust Forms 
Contrary to its long-standing policy of refusing to publish and give 
advance approval to trust forms, the Service issued model provisions for 
charitable remainder trusts in Revenue Ruling 72-395.24 These provi- 
sions are merely "illustrative," however, as the ruling expressly states 
that no fixed language is required in order to qualify under section 664.25 
However, the model provisions will be "accepted by the Internal 
Revenue Service in the absence of any showing that they are not enforce- 
able under applicable local law. "26 
Only a general discussion of the model provisions and the comments 
provided by Revenue Ruling 72-395 will be attempted in this article 
since excellent discussions of the regulations and the ruling appear else- 
where.27 The ruling describes six mandatory provisions for annuity 
trusts, including: (1) creation of a proper annuity amount, (2) creation 
of a proper remainder interest, (3) selection of an alternative charit- 
able beneficiary if the remainderman does not qualify under section 
l7O(c) at the time of distribution, (4) computation of the annuity amount 
in short and final taxable years, (5) prohibition of additional contribu- 
tions, and (6) inclusion of prohibitions governing private  foundation^.^^ 
Seven mandatory provisions are made applicable to unitrusts consisting 
of all of the above except (5), which is modified to permit additional 
contributions if the trust instrument so provides, and a mandatory pro- 
vision requiring adjustments if the unitrust amount has been incorrectly 
determined.29 Nine optional provisions, with comments, are also set 
forth for both types of trusts.30 
The significance of this ruling stems not only from the model pro- 
visions, but also from the fact that the language of the ruling was de- 
veloped contemporaneously with the drafting of the final regulations 
and issued one day prior to their publication. Any questions concerning 
the interpretation of the regulations should, therefore, be considered in 
-- -- - 
241972-2 CUM. BULL. 340. 
25Zd. at 341-42. 
26Id. In addition, a valid trust must be created under the applicable local law. 
27See note 15 supra. 
28Rev. Rul. 395, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 340, 342-44. 
29Zd. at 347-49. 
3OId. at 344-47, 350-52. 
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light of the provisions of this ruling, as courts are likely to regard it as 
tantamount to an extension of the reg~lations.3~ 
Revenue Ruling 72-395 also provides that Revenue Procedure 72-3 
applies to determine whether the Service will issue advance rulings 
concerning qualification of an instrument under section 664.32 Under 
Revenue Procedure 72-3 the Service will not entertain requests con- 
cerning testamentary trusts, but will accept such requests concerning 
inter vivos trusts.33 
B. Reuenue Ruling 73-571 - Common Trust Fund Investments 
Revenue Ruling 73-57 permits a bank, as trustee of a unitrust, to 
invest the assets of the trust in a common trust fund described in section 
584(a) of the Code without jeopardizing either the exempt status of the 
unitrust or the donor's charitable deduction. The ruling involved a 
common trust fund in which an aggregate of less than 2 percent of the 
outstanding units of participation were owned by qualified charitable 
remainder trusts and over 90 percent of the units were owned by inter 
vivos revocable noncharitable trusts. The bank, as trustee of the uni- 
trust, had full discretion over the investment of trust assets.35 
Normally, published rulings are issued only in cases where an import- 
ant question has not been resolved by existing case law, regulations, or 
other rulings. It is therefore surprising that the Service felt it necessary 
to issue a ruling on this question, as one would have thought that the 
right of a bank to make such an investment was clear. 
One issue which may have been implicitly decided by the ruling is 
whether investment by a bank trustee of unikust assets in the bank's com- 
mon trust fund, for which it also acts as trustee, constitutes a proscribed 
311n contrast to regulations, which are statements of general policy or interpretations for 
guidance of the general public, the holding of a Revenue Ruling is limited since it is ad- 
dressed to a particular state of facts. Rev. Proc. 1, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 693, 694-95. Revoca- 
tion of a Revenue Ruling is normally prospective only. Revenue Ruling 72-395, however, is 
not addressed to a particular state of facts and cannot be so limited, since it expresses general 
policy and an interpretation of the statute and regulations. See Rogovin, The Four R.'s: 
Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity - A View from Within, 8 CCH 1974 STAND. 
FED. TAX REP. 1 5980 A.0152, at 67,033. 
3*Rev. Proc. 3, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 698. 
33Zd. at 700. 
34Rev. Rul. 571, 1973-2 CUM. BULL. 213. 
35The ruling does not discuss whether a trust instrument may properly direct the trustee 
to invest trust assets in investments which are clearly income producing, such as Treasury 
bills, bank deposits, common trust funds maintained by the bank, or other investments which 
have a proven earnings history. Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-1(a)(3) (1972) does not clarify whether all 
express restrictions are prohibited or merely those which could prevent production of a 
reasonable amount of current income or gain. Although there is no clear answer to any of 
these questions, there should be little harm in permitting restrictions which allow the trustee 
sufficient opportunity to earn a reasonable amount of income or gain as measured by the 
state prudent man standards. See note 16 supra. 
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act of self-dealing within the meaning of section 4941.36 Clearly, the bank 
is a disqualified person37 with respect to the unitrust. The investment of 
trust assets in the bank's common trust fund is a service rendered for a fee, 
and therefore constitutes an act of self-dealing. The ruling thus appears 
to constitute an implicit determination that one of the exceptions to the 
definition of self-dealing applies. The most likely exception is that pro- 
viding for the payment of compensation to a disqualified person in an 
amount which is not excessive for "personal services which are reason- 
able and necessary" to carry out the purposes of the ~ni t rus t .3~  Whether 
the ruling would continue to apply to investments in a common trust 
fund in which a substantial portion or a majority of all participation units 
were owned by qualified charitable remainder trusts is left unclear. The 
Service may contend that such a common trust fund is tantamount to a 
type of pooled income fund where assets are commingled for investment 
without meeting the requirements of section 642(c)(5) or the apparent 
requirement that charitable trust assets be held and invested separately 
from assets of other t r~s t s . 3~  
C. Revenue Ruling 73-610 - Investment Restrictions 
In Revenue Ruling 73-61 O,*O the annuity trust permitted the grantor's 
spouse, who was also the sole life income beneficiary of the trust, to have 
the use of the grantor's antique collection for her life. The annuity trust 
failed to qualify under section 664 because the existence of a life estate in 
the antique collection restricted the trustee from investing all of the trust 
assets in a manner "which could result in the annual realization of a rea- 
sonable amount of income and gain from the sale or other disposition of 
trust assets." The facts indicated that all of the other assets of the trust 
were income producing, and the trustee was not subject to any restriction 
as to their investment. 
The ruling illustrates the severe consequences if a relatively innocuous 
right is given to the income beneficiary in violation of the strictly inter- 
preted regulations. The Service apparently gave no consideration to 
whether the antique collection would likely appreciate over the years, or 
whether the life estate in any practical way jeopardized the interests of 
charity. The lesson of the ruling, it appears, is that a life estate in any 
asset of a charitable remainder trust (whether income producing or not) 
will cause disqualification of the trust under section 664. Efforts 
- - -  - - - - --- 
36Section 4941 (d)(l ) (C) .  
37Section 4946(a)(l)(B). 
38Section 4941 (d)(2)(E). 
39Although no such requirement is expressly stated in the statute and regulations, it may 
be inferred from the no additional contribution rule applicable to annuity trusts and the 
requirement that all unitrust assets be valued annually. 
401973-2 CUM. BULL. 213. 
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to avoid this result by including the fair rental value of the reserved life 
estate as a component of the annuity or unitrust amount payable will 
probably fail, because under normal circumstances, the trustee cannot 
sell an asset subject to a life estate. 
In addition to the ground discussed in the ruling, the trust might also 
have been disqualified on the theory that the right of the noncharitable 
beneficiary to use a principal asset of the trust during her life constituted 
an act of self-dealing.41 
D. Revenue Ruling 74-19 - Payout Formula 
Revenue Ruling 74-1942 involved a trust instrument which formu- 
lated the unitrust amount payable as 6 percent of the annual net fair 
market value of the trust assets reduced by the portion of the trustee's fee 
fairly attributable to the income beneficiary's interest. In no event, how- 
ever, was the amount so deducted to reduce the unitrust amount payable 
below 5 percent of the net fair market value of the trust assets. The 
ruling concluded that the unitrust failed to qualify under section 664 be- 
cause the unitrust amount payable was not literally computed pursuant 
to a "fixed percentage'' of the net fair market value of trust assets. 
The Service's strict interpretation of the regulations is surprising, be- 
cause the unitrust amount payable could be computed with precision 
and could not fall below the 5 percent minimum. Any hope that the 
Service would mitigate the rigidity of the regulations by a flexible ad- 
ministrative interpretation, especially in areas where little or no abuse is 
possible, should be dispelled by this ruling. Absent a change in the Ser- 
vice's position, a prudent draftsman must assume that any reduction or 
adjustment in the annuity or unitrust amount payable, for whatever 
reasons, risks disqualification of the trust under section 664. This posi- 
tion raises particular difficulties in New York43 and other jurisdictions, 
where a "Warms adj~stment '"~ is required by state law in every case 
where administration expenses of an estate or trust are claimed as deduc- 
tions on the trust's income tax return. The theory underlying this adjust- 
ment is that a deduction on the trust's income tax return benefits the 
income beneficiaries, and therefore the principal must be reimbursed for 
its fair share of the deduction. Any adjustment of the annuity or unitrust 
amount based on such considerations, however, appears to risk disqualifi- 
cation of the trust under section 664. This presents a dilemma to the 
trustee in jurisdictions holding him liable to the remainderman for 
failure to make the adjustment. 
4lSee sections 4941(d)(l)(E) and 494'7(a)(2)(A). 
4219'74-1 CLM. BULL. 155. 
43K.Y. EST., POWERS, K.TRUSTS LAW 9 1 1-1.2(X) (McKinney 196'7). 
441n re Warms' Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (X.Y. County Sur. Ct. 1955). 
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E. Revenue Ruling 74-386 - Payout Termination 
Revenue Ruling 74-38645 permits a qualified remainder trust to 
terminate the payment of the annuity or unitrust amount to each life 
beneficiary with the regular payment next preceding the date of death 
of such beneficiary. Prior to this ruling, several private rulings had been 
issued in which the Service took the position that payment of the annuity 
or unitrust amount could only terminate with the regular payment next 
preceding the termination of all noncharitable interests.46 Under this 
published ruling, administration of charitable trusts is therefore made 
easier since the obligation to pro rate the amount owing to the date of 
each beneficiary's death is avoided. 
The issuance of Revenue Ruling 74-386 constitutes a reversal of the 
Service's original position on what appears to be an extremely technical 
point, and is the first indication that a more practical and flexible con- 
struction may be given certain of the regulations. It is hoped that this 
approach will develop into a trend in all cases where there is little or no  
practical risk that the interests of charity or the basic purposes underlying 
the statute would be jeopardized. 
F. Revenue Ruling 74-481 - Computation of the Unitrust Payout 
When Additional Contributions Are Received 
Revenue Ruling 74-48147 illustrates the computation of the unitrust 
amount payable where additional contributions are received by the uni- 
trust during the taxable year.4* Unlike the usual published ruling which 
reaches a conclusion in the context of stated facts, the ruling discussed 
the computations in general terms and may be viewed by a court as being 
tantamount to an extension of the reg~lations.~g 
No discussion of these computations will be made here, except to point 
out a trap which should be avoided. The  Service has issued a private 
ruling disqualifying a trust under section 664 because the denominator 
of the fraction used to pro rate the amount owing to the noncharitable in- 
terest, in the case of a taxable year shortened by the death of the sole life 
beneficiary, was the last day of the taxable year rather than the earlier of 
that date or the date of the beneficiary's death. In this case, the trust 
451974 INT. REV. BULL. NO. 32, at 1 1 .  
46For example, in the case of a trust with two life beneficiaries, this rule would have meant 
that payment could only terminate upon the death of the second life beneficiary because that 
was the end of the "period" referred to in Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(5) (1972). A trust provision per- 
mitting termination of such payment upon the death of the first as well as upon the death o f  
the second life beneficiary would have caused disqualification of the trust under section 664 
because the "period" had not come to an end. 
471974 INT. REV. BULL. NO. 40, at 15. 
48Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(b) (1 972). 
49See note 3 1 supra. 
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failed to qualify even though the noncompliance occurred in a relatively 
minor matter, and actually enhanced the value of the charitable remain- 
der interest. Moreover, it would not appear that this trap can be avoided 
by arguing that the taxable year ends upon the death of the income bene- 
ficiary because charitable remainder trusts do not terminate for tax pur- 
poses upon such death, but remain open for a reasonable period of time 
to permit settlement of the trust's affakSO The position of the Service 
requires that the obligation to the noncharitable beneficiary end with 
his death, and the governing trust language must therefore anticipate 
the possibility that the beneficiary may die within the taxable year in 
which an additional contribution is received. 
IV. CURRENT PROBLEM AREAS 
The following sections discuss several current problems in drafting 
charitable remainder trust agreements and in administering estates and 
trusts having charitable remainder interests. Model forms for such trusts 
are not set forth, since they are the subject of Revenue Ruling 72-395 and 
other published articles. 
A. Designation of the Charitable Remainderman 
1. Requirements for qual2fication under section 664. A very basic 
question in the drafting of charitable remainder trusts is whether the 
charitable remainderman must be specifically named irithe trust instru- 
ment, or whether the instrument may simply designate charitable pur- 
poses or a class of charities, giving the trustee discretion to select the ulti- 
mate charitable recipients.S1 The regulations require a trust instrument 
to provide that an irrevocable remainder interest must be held "for the 
benefit of, or to be paid over to, charity, "s2 and explain that upon the ex- 
piration of the noncharitable interest, "the entire corpus of the trust is re- 
quired to be irrevocably transferred, in whole or in part, to or for the use 
of one of more organizations described in section 170(c) or retained, in 
whole or in part, for such use. "53 Whether this language means that the 
charitable beneficiary must be specifically named and identified in the 
trust instrument is not clear. 
One answer is suggested by analogy with comment (2) of Revenue 
Ruling 72-395 58 4.02 and 6.02, which provides that a charitable remain- 
der may be: (1) distributed outright to, or held in further trust for, one 
or more charities; (2) held in further trust for "charitable purposes"; or 
50Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(6) (1972). 
S1Only an organization described in section 170(c) may qualify as a remainderman. Treas. 
Reg. 55 1.664-2(a)(6), -3(a)(6) (1972). Thus, only domestic charities may be qualified recipients. 
S2Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(l)(i) (1972). 
S3Trea.s. Reg. 55 1.664-2(a)(6)(i), -3(a)(6)(i) (1972). 
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(3) disposed of in any combination of the foregoing.S4 The comment ap- 
pears to permit a trust provision giving the trustee discretion to select the 
specific charitable recipients where the remainder is held in further trust 
for charitable purposes. There is little reason to distinguish this case 
from a case in which the trust is required to terminate and distribute all 
remaining trust assets to or for the use of one or more charitable organi- 
zations. In both cases, the trustee's discretion would be bounded by sec- 
tion 170(c). It is suggested, therefore, that the Service should issue a pub- 
lished ruling stating that a trust instrument authorizing the trustee to 
exercise discretion in selecting qualified charitable recipients upon ter- 
mination of the trust is valid under section 664. 
A related problem is that the regulations do not indicate whether a 
donor may reserve the right to designate, either by inter vivos instrument 
or by will, the charitable recipients of the remainder interest. The Ser- 
vice presently allows such designation only by inter vivos instrument, and 
will disqualify the trust if the donor retains a power to designate or alter 
the specific charitable recipients by will. The regulations provide, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
A trust is not a charitable remainder annuity trust [or unitrust] if any 
person has the power to alter the amount to be paid to any named person 
other than an organization described in $ 170(c) if such power would 
cause any person to be treated as the owner of the trust, or any portion 
thereof, if subpart E of part 1 of subchapter J of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A 
of the Code were applicable to such trust.55 
This language is concerned solely with a power in any person to alter the 
amount to be paid to a noncharitable income beneficiary and does not 
apply to a power to designate the recipient of the charitable remainder 
interest. Given the likelihood that both the needs of charity as well as 
the charitable interests of donors may change, it is reasonable to permit 
the donor to name the charitable remainder beneficiary either during 
his lifetime or upon his death without disqualification under section 664. 
As discussed above, the principal requirement of the statute and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder is satisfied because the remainder 
interest either passes "to, or for the use 06 an organization described in 
Section 170(c) or is to be retained by the trust for such use."56 
2. Section l7O(bXl) deduction limitations. A gift which is deemed 
to have been made "to'' a charitable organization rather than merely "for 
the use of" such an organization is eligible for both the maximum per- 
centage limitations provided for charitable contributions under section 
l7O(b)(l)(A) and for a carryover for 5 years of any excess contribution 
- - 
541972-2 CUM. BULL. 340, 343, 347. The  ruling only contains examples of trust instru- 
ments in which specific charities are named. 
55Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(3)(ii), -3(a)(3)(ii) (1972). 
56Treas. Reg. $5  1.664-2(a)(6)(i), -3(a)(6)(i) (1972). 
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deductions pursuant to section l7O(d)(l) of the Code.S7 However, if the 
charitable remainder beneficiary is not specifically named in the trust 
instrument and the power of selection is reserved to the trustee or donor, 
a question arises as to whether the gift in trust is made "to" charity or 
merely "for the use o f '  charity. In Lawrence R. JamesS8 the Tax Court 
drew a distinction between a right to the income from trust assets, which 
was held to constitute a gift "for the use of" charity, and a vested right in 
the remainder interest of the trust (i.e., trust principal), which was charac- 
terized as a gift "to" charit~.~g Alice Tullym was cited by the court in 
James for the proposition that a gift of a remainder interest in trust 
creates a present right in the principal of the trust, even though the 
recipient charities were not expressly designated in the trust instrument 
but were to be selected from among the class defined by section 1 7O(b)(l) 
(A). 
No relevant change has been made in section l7O(b)(l) since the Tully 
case, although section 664 has subsequently created two new forms of 
charitable remainder trusts. The Tully and James cases should stand, 
therefore, for the proposition that a charitable remainder trust de- 
scribed in section 664(d) constitutes a gift "to" charity for purposes of 
section 170, even though the specific charitable remainderman may not 
be named in the trust instrument. 
Since the principal of an annuity trust or unitrust may be invaded for 
the benefit of noncharitable interests only to the extent necessary to 
satisfy the annual payout requirement, the value of the remainder 
interest ultimately passing to charity can be measured with comparative 
ease.62 In addition, as long as the transfer of property is irrevocable and 
the trust instrument limits the class of eligible remainder recipients 
strictly to organizations described in section 1 70(c), the underlying pur- 
pose of the 1969 reforms will be satisfied, i.e., the amount of the charit- 
able deduction allowed will more nearly reflect the amount ultimately 
passing to charity. Under the authority of Tully and other similar cases, 
the question of exactly which section 170(c) organizations will ultimately 
receive the trust remainder is immaterial. The maximum charitable 
s7Treas. Reg. §$ 1.1TiOA-8(a)(2), -8(b), -10(a), -10(b) (1972). 
5862 T.C. NO. 23 (May 15, 1974). 
59The court held in James that a gift in trust of $1,250 to be paid first out of income and 
then out of principal to organizations to be selected by the trustee for exclusively religious, 
charitable, or educational purposes constituted a gift "for the use o f '  charity because charity 
could only have a present right to the principal of the trust if the income of the trust was in- 
sufficient to provide for the fixed annual payment. Such a possibility was held to be so remote 
as to be negligible. Id. 
6048 T-C. 235 (1 965). 
61Lawrence R. James, 62 T.C. No. 23 (May 15, 1954). 
62For a more complete discussion of this point see notes 93-105 and accompanying text 
infra. 
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deduction permitted under section 170(b)(l)(A) should therefore be 
available to the settlor of an otherwise qualified charitable remainder 
annuity trust or unitrust irrespective of powers in the donor or trustee 
to designate the specific charitable recipients. 
B. Problems Arising from Deferral of the Annuity or Unitrust 
Amount Payable 
A testamentary charitable remainder trust is deemed created at the 
date of the settlor's death, even though the trust is not actually funded 
until after a reasonable period for administration of an estate or settle- 
ment of a terminating trust, provided that the obligation to pay the 
annuity or unitrust amount begins as of the date of death.63 In such cir- 
cumstances, actual payment of the annuity or unitrust amount may be 
deferred (if permitted by state law and the trust instrument) until the 
end of the taxable year of the trust in which complete funding occurs.64 
Problems have arisen, however, in determining whether deferral will 
also be permitted for certain types of inter vivos remainder trusts, and in 
computing the deferred annuity or unitrust amount payable to the non- 
charitable income beneficiary. 
1. When is deferral permitted? As previously noted, where complete 
funding of an otherwise qualified testamentary trust is dependent upon 
pourover contributions from an estate or a terminating trust, payment of 
the annuity or unitrust amount may be deferred during a reasonable 
period for administration of the estate or settlement of the prior trust.65 
However, the regulations do not expressly indicate whether the right to 
defer payment of the annuity or unitrust amount is available in situations 
other than those involving testamentary trusts. Reg. 8 1.664-1(a)(5) is 
entitled "Rules applicable to testamentary transfers,'' but nothing in the 
text of the regulation or in the accompanying examples of situations in 
which deferral is permitted suggests that a restrictive application of the 
deferral rules was intended. 
In the usual case involving an inter vivos remainder trust which is 
either irrevocable or is to become irrevocable on the death of the grantor, 
the trust is fully funded during the grantor's lifetime66 and is not de- 
pendent upon pourover contributions from an estate or another trust. 
In such cases it is clear that deferral of the annuity or unitrust amount 
payable is neither necessary nor permissible. The regulations are not 
clear, however, as to whether deferral may be available in cases involving: 
(1) a revocable, nominally funded inter vivos charitable remainder trust 
which, pursuant to its terms, becomes irrevocable on the death of the 
63Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-l(a)(5)(i) (1972). 
641d. 
65Treas. Reg. § 1.664-l(a)(5)(i) (1972). 
66See generally Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-l(a)(6) (example 1 )  (1972). 
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grantor and which is dependent for complete funding upon a pourover 
from an estate or a terminating trust; or (2) an irrevocable, funded inter 
vivos unitrust which is to receive a pourover from an estate or a terminat- 
ing trust. 
a. T h e  revocable, nominally funded inter vivos trust. Whenever 
complete funding of a revocable, inter vivos charitable remainder trust, 
which is to become irrevocable on the death of the grantor, is dependent 
upon a pourover contribution from an estate or another terminating 
trust, deferral of the annuity or unitrust amount payable should be al- 
lowed during a reasonable period for administration of the estate or 
settlement of the prior trust. The crucial factor in the application of the 
deferral rules of Reg. 5 1.664-1 (a)(5)(i) appears to be the dependency of 
thbe trust on a pourover contribution. While revocable inter vivos trusts 
of this type may be nominally funded during the life of the grantor, as a 
factual matter, they are totally dependent upon a pourover before com- 
plete funding can occur. Thus, despite the absence of express language in 
the regulations which would permit this result, allowing deferral in such 
cases should be fully justified because the significance of the trust and its 
role in the estate plan parallels that of a testamentary trust which is de- 
pendent upon a pourover for complete funding, and for which deferral 
is clearly allowed. 
b. T h e  irrevocable, funded inter viuos unitrust. The problem pre- 
sented in the case of an irrevocable, funded inter vivos unitrust, which is 
entitled to receive additional contributions from the grantor's estate or 
from another trust terminating on the grantor's death, lies in determin- 
ing when the contribution is deemed to have been made for purposes of 
computing the unitrust amount payable to the noncharitable beneficiary. 
Is the contribution made as of the date of the grantor's death or as of the 
date when the final distribution from the estate or terminating trust 
has been made? The regulations clearly provide that all property passing 
to a unitrust by reason of the grantor's death is considered one contribu- 
t i ~ n , ~ ~  and since the unitrust becomes entitled to receive this contribu- 
tion from the date of the grantor's death, the Service could insist that the 
contribution was made on that date. Accordingly, the trustee could be 
required to make a reasonable estimate of the then present value of the 
contribution and to reflect that amount in his determination of the 
annual amount payable for each year prior to the actual receipt of such 
contribution. If, on the other hand, the contribution is deemed made in 
the year in which the full amount of property passing to the unitrust by 
reason of the death of the grantor has actually been received, no annual 
amount attributable to the additional contribution would be required 
to be paid to the noncharitable beneficiary until such year - a result 
67Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(b) (1 972). 
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clearly unfair to such beneficiary. A practical solution would be to 
assume that the additional contribution was made as of the date of the 
grantor's death, but permit deferral of the amount payable until the full 
amount of the contribution has actually been received by the trust. 
While this result is not expressly provided by the regulations, it appears 
to be consistent with the requirements of Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(5)(i) which 
limit deferral to those cases in which actual receipt of the funds passing 
to the trust by reason of the settlor's death is delayed for a reasonable 
period for administration of the estate or settlement of a terminating 
trust. 
2. What constitutes "complete fundingJ'? Once it is concluded that 
payment of the annuity or unitrust amount may be deferred, the trustee 
of a charitable remainder trust must still determine the length of the 
period during which deferral is permissible. The regulations provide 
that payment may be deferred until the end of the taxable year in which 
"complete funding" of the trust occurs,68 but fail to specify whether 
"complete funding" means actual or constructive receipt of all property 
passing to the trust by reason of the grantor's death. This distinction 
becomes significant in those cases in which an estate or inter vivos trust 
is deemed terminated for tax purposes before all pourover amounts 
designated for the charitable remainder trust have been distributed. 
The Service might take the position that in such circumstances the charit- 
able remainder trust is in constructive receipt of all pourover amounts 
as of the date of termination. Accordingly, since payment of the annuity 
or unitrust amount may not be deferred after "complete funding" of the 
trust, the trustee of the charitable remainder trust could be required to 
cause the executor or trustee of the terminated estate or trust to pay the 
annuity or unitrust amount to the noncharitable income beneficiary 
within a reasonable period following termination.69 However, this 
situation is likely to arise only in the unusual circumstances where the 
Service deems an estate or trust terminated for tax purposes because of 
the lapse of an unreasonable period for administration or ~e t t l emen t .~~  
It would therefore seem appropriate to permit the charitable remainder 
trust to remain qualified, even though the annuity or unitrust amount is 
not paid within a reasonable period following such termination, as long 
as the trustee has acted reasonably in pursuing his rights under state law 
against the fiduciary of the terminated estate or trust. 
A related problem which may occur more frequently arises in the case 
6sTreas. Reg. 5 1.664-1 (a)(5)(i) (1972). 
69A trust must pay any deferred amount within a reasonable period of time after the com- 
plete funding of the trust. Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(5)(i) (1972). A reasonable period of time 
for payment of the unitrust amount following the end of the taxable year extends to the date 
upon which the trustee is required to file Form 1041-B (including extensions) for such year. 
Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l )(i)(a) (1972). 
'OTreas. Reg. 5 1.641 (b)-3(b) (1 956). 
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of a terminated estate or trust which either comes into possession of 
unforeseen assets or which, after paying all debts and liabilities, finds that 
it has excess assets distributable to the charitable remainder trust. Pre- 
sumably, the charitable remainder trust was completely funded upon the 
"final" distribution from the terminated estate or trust. This unexpected 
receipt of additional assets raises a question concerning the obligation of 
the trustee to the noncharitable income beneficiary with respect to pay- 
ment of the annual amount due in prior years. A practical solution to 
this problem would be to treat the newly found assets as increasing the 
value of the general trust assets as of the date of actual receipt. The 
administrative convenience of this approach should be particularly ap- 
pealing to the trustee, since the payout to the noncharitable income 
beneficiary would be increased only in the year in which such assets 
were actually received. 
The prospect of receiving additional assets presents particularly 
knotty theoretical questions in the case of an annuity trust, since no addi- 
tional contributions are permitted to be received by such trust. However, 
the answer may be that all property passing to the trust by reason of the 
death of the grantor is treated as one contribution - a rule which should 
encompass the receipt of additional assets under the above circum- 
stances.T1 
3. Ne t  fair market value. Before discussing the actual computation 
of the deferred amount payable to the noncharitable beneficiary, it is 
desirable to examine the definition of the term "net fair market value." 
In general, the sum certain to be paid under an annuity trust must be 
stated as a fraction or a percentage (which is not less than 5 percent) of 
the "initial net fair market value," as finally determined for federal tax 
purposes, of the property passing in trust.72 The unitrust amount pay- 
able must be computed pursuant to a fixed percentage (which is not less 
than 5 percent of the "net fair market value of the trust assets determined 
ann~ally."~3 However, neither section 664, nor the regulations there- 
under, define the term "net fair market value," and it is not used in any 
other section of the Code.74 Instead, the regulations merely provide that, 
in determining the net fair market value of the trust property, all assets 
and liabilities of the trust are to be taken into account regardless of 
whether particular items would be included in determining the income 
of the trust.75 
71Treas. Reg. 8 1.664-2(b) (1972). 
72Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(l)(ii), -2(a)(l)(iii), -2(a)(2)(i) (1972). 
73Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(a) (1972). 
741t does, however, appear in Treas. Reg. $5 1.334-l(c)(4)(viii) (1955), and 1.334-2 (1955) 
(relating to the basis of property received by shareholders in a corporate liquidation under 
section 333), where the term is defined as the fair market value of an asset less any specific 
mortgage or pledge to which the asset is subject. 
75Treas. Reg. 8 1 -664-3(a)(l)(iv) (1 972). 
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The regulations also provide that the trustee shall have full discretion 
in selecting the taxable year of the trust, the valuation date or dates, and 
the valuation methods to be used in making the computation. However, 
once made, the trustee's election is irrevocable and must be consistently 
followed in subsequent year~.~6 Thus, the trustee should carefully con- 
sider his options of utilizing different methods and dates in valuing 
separate categories of trust property and in computing the net fair market 
value on the basis of the average or mean of such values. Moreover, in 
the absence of specific section 664 rules or methods for valuing different 
categories of trust property, the trustee may appropriately refer to the 
rules and methods for valuing assets for estate tax purposes contained 
in section 203 1, or to the section 4942 rules concerning the valuation of 
assets for determining the annual amount of qualifying distributions 
which must be made by private foundations.77 
Special valuation problems are presented by accrued liabilities, such as 
funeral expenses, trustee's commissions, and attorney's fees. Even though 
the trust's accounts are kept on the cash method of accounting, such 
liabilities should be deductible from the gross fair market value of trust 
assets if ascertainable with reasonable certainty, i.e., if all events have oc- 
curred which fix the liability, even though the amount must be estimated 
and cannot be fixed with exac tnes~ .~~  
For example, annual trustee commissions should constitute an accrued 
liability in each taxable year even though they are not paid until the 
trustee's final accounting has been approved. Commissions based upon 
the final value of the estate or trust assets, on the other hand, should con- 
stitute an accrued liability only in the final taxable year. Attorney's fees 
present a more difficult question because they represent services rendered 
over the entire period, but may not be approved for payment in full until 
the entire legal account has been settled. A practical resolution of this 
problem would be to assume that if a bill has been received by the trustee 
requesting partial payment (i.e., creating an account) for legal services 
rendered, an accrued liability would be created. In the absence of such a 
bill, however, it may be difficult for the trustee to make an estimate of the 
portion of the legal expense incurred in any specific taxable year. In  such 
cases, the legal fee should be taken as an accrued expense in the final tax- 
able year of the estate or terminating trust, which would normally be the 
year in which complete funding of the remainder trust occurs. 
7 6 ~ d .  
77F0r example, securities which are traded in the public markets are valued for purposes 
of Treas. Reg. 8 20.2031-2(b) (1958) as the mean of the highest and lowest quoted selling 
prices on the valuation date. No specific rule is laid down under Treas. Reg. 8 53.4942(a)-2(c) 
(4)(i) (1973), however, except the statement that a computer pricing system accepted by the 
Commissioner for federal estate tax purposes may be used. 
'8Treas. Reg. $8 1.461-1(a)(2) (1947), 20.2053-1 (b)(3) (1958). 
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4. Corrective payments arising from a final determination of net fair 
market value. The net fair market value of the trust property is likely to 
be incorrectly determined from time to time. In order to qualify under 
section 664, the trust instrument must, therefore, provide for corrective 
payments by the trustee in the case of an underpayment, and for similar 
payments by the beneficiary in case of an ~verpayment.~S uch correc- 
tive payments must be distributed within a reasonable period of time 
after the final determination of net fair market value,80 and are included 
in the taxable year in which paid, credited, or required to be distributed, 
even though made with respect to a prior ~ e a r . ~ l  The regulations do not 
indicate who is to make such final determination, but it seems clearly 
intended that such determination is either to be made by the Commis- 
sioner or adjudicated in court. 
In the case of an annuity trust, proper determination of net fair market 
value should not prove particularly troublesome, since in the usual case, 
the value of the assets transferred to the trust will be finally determined 
upon the audit of the income or estate tax return filed by the grantor or 
his estate. In contrast, the problem of accurately determining net fair 
market value should arise persistently in the case of a unitrust, because 
the trustee's determination will generally not be subject to current 
review by the Service unless the issue is raised and determined during an 
audit of the income beneficiary's tax return. Moreover, even though the 
beneficiaries acquiesce in the trustee's valuation of the assets, both the 
trustee and the beneficiaries will remain contingently liable for any ad- 
justment in such value by the Service until such time as the Service is 
legally bound not to raise the issue. Until that happens, either through 
the running of the statute or the execution of a closing agreement, there 
has been no final determination within the meaning of the regulations. 
This aspect of charitable remainder trusts creates a risk of liability both 
to the trustee and to the beneficiaries not usually found in the circum- 
stances presented by other forms of trusts and estates. 
5. Determination of the annuity or unitrust amount payable during 
the deferral period. The method for determining the aggregate annuity 
or unitrust amount payable at the end of the deferral period may differ 
in the case of an annuity trust as opposed to a unitrust. With respect to an 
annuity trust, the amount payable is the difference between (a) the 
amounts actually distributed to the noncharitable income beneficiary 
during the deferral period, plus compound interest computed at 6 per- 
cent a year, and (b) the annuity amount payable, plus compound interest 
at 6 percent a year.g2 The annuity amount payable in (b) must either be 
79Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(1) (iii) (1972), -3(a)(l)(iii) (1972). 
s01d. 
slTreas. Reg. 5 1.664-1 (d)(4)(ii) ( 1  972). 
82Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-1 (a)(5)(i) (1 972). 
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a stated dollar amount., or a fraction or percentage of the initial net fair 
market value of the property irrevocably passing in trust as finally deter- 
mined for federal tax purposes.83 The valuation may be made, at the 
election of the executor, either as of the date of the settlor's death or on 
the alternative valuation date of 6 months following the settlor's death.84 
The general computation method described above may also be used in 
the case of a unitrust. However, as previously indicated, the unitrust 
amount payable is a fixed percentage of the net fair market value of the 
trust assets, as determined annually85 using the valuation dates and 
methods initially selected by the trustee. Thus, computation of the uni- 
trust amount payable is more complex, because a separate valuation must 
be made for each year of the deferral period. 
In addition to the general computation discussed above, tAe regula- 
tions also provide an alternative formula for computing the deferred 
amount payable under a u n i t r u ~ t . ~ ~  Since use of the alternative formula 
is not discretionary with the trustee, but rather must be incorporated in 
the governing unitrust instrument (either explicitly or by reference), 
the draftsman must be aware of the differences between the alternative 
formula and the general computation. 
For example, the date for valuing trust assets in the general computa- 
tion may be selected by the trustee (usually the first day of the taxable 
year), and if 3 years elapse before the unitrust is completely funded, 
separate computations based on the valuation date selected by the trustee 
are required for each of the 3 years. The valuation date of the alternative 
formula, on the other hand, is the earlier of the date of death of the last 
noncharitable income beneficiary, or the last day of the taxable year in 
which complete funding of the trust occurs. Significant differences will 
result, therefore, if there has been a substantial increase or decrease in 
the value of trust property during the deferral period. Moreover, even 
if the value of the trust assets were identical for both computations, 
the alternative formula would yield a lower payout to the noncharitable 
beneficiary for two reasons: (1) the formula assumes that a valuation of 
the assets at the end of the deferral period includes the actual income 
earned during the period, and that the addition of 6 percent interest is 
therefore unnecessary; and (2) the tables referred to in the formula com- 
pute the 6 percent interest as owing from the end of the taxable year 
rather than from the date on which payment is required under the trust 
instrument, e.g., equal monthly payments. The draftsman must care- 
fully evaluate the nature of the assets transferred to the trust, the inter- 
83For a discussion of what may constitute a final determination see text accompanying note 
80 supra. 
S4Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-2(c) (1 972). 
SsTreas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(a) (1972). 
s6Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(5)(ii) (1972). 
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ests of the income beneficiary, and the administrative convenience af- 
forded the trustee in making the required computations before deciding 
whether to include the alternate formula in the trust instrument. 
The language of the alternate formula presents some ambiguity when 
applied to a trust which has been only partially fitnded on the death of 
the last income beneficiary. The formula computes the unitrust amount 
payable on the earlier of the date of death of the last income beneficiary 
or the date on which the trust is completely funded, and provides that on 
such date the value "of the property held in trust which is attributable to 
property passing to the trust at the death of the decedent" is to be mea- 
sured.87 It is unclear whether this language refers to the full amount of 
property ultimately to pass to the trust by reason of the death of the 
settlor, or only to such portion of that property as is actually held in trust 
on the death of the last income beneficiary. Since a trust which is un- 
funded or only partially funded on the date of death of the income bene- 
ficiary would not actually hold in trust the full amount of the assets ulti- 
mately to be distributed to it when completely funded, the language "of 
the property held in trust" should be construed to mean the value of all 
property which is required to pass to the trust by reason of the death of 
the grantor, whether or not such property is actually held in trust on the 
date of death of the last noncharitable beneficiary. 
C. Tax Consequences of an Estate's Accumulation or Distribution 
of Amounts Payable to a Charitable Remainder Trust 
The remaining sections of this article explore some of the differing tax 
consequences to the grantor's estate, the charitable remainder beneficiary, 
and the noncharitable income beneficiary flowing from the estate's 
accumulation or distribution of "trust" income prior to complete fund- 
ing of the trust. 
1. Current distribution by the estate to the noncharitable beneficiary 
of the charitable remainder trust. If the estate distributes amounts direct- 
ly to the noncharitable beneficiary during the administration period, the 
estate is allowed a distribution deduction pursuant to section 66 1 (a). Up- 
on receipt of such distributions, the beneficiary will recognize income 
for federal income tax purposes as provided under the familiar distribut- 
able net income ("DNI ") rules of sections 66 1 and 662, rather than under 
the special characterization rules of section 664.88 It is possible, there- 
fore, for the estate to withhold all distributions to the income beneficiary 
until a year in which little or no taxable income has been realized by the 
estate, e.g., a short taxable year caused by termination of the estate. The 
871d. 
88Section 662(a), (b); Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-1 (a)(5)(iii) ( 1  972). 
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amounts distributed to the beneficiary under such circumstances would 
be subject to little, if any, tax.89 
2. ABA committee proposal concerning the section 642(cj deduction 
for accumulations of income payable to the charitable remainder trust. 
If an estate accumulates income for eventual distribution to a charitable 
remainder trust, a question arises as to whether the estate is entitled to a 
section 642(c) charitable deduction (set aside deduction) for income per- 
manently set aside for a qualified section 664 trust. This question is the 
subject of a 1974 report by a committee of the Tax Section of the Ameri- 
can Bar Association.90 The committee proposed adding a new paragraph 
"(3)" to section 642(c) which would expressly allow a deduction for any 
amount of the estate's distributable net income, reduced by tax exempt 
income, which, pursuant to the terms of the will, was permanently set 
aside during the taxable year for distribution to a qualified section 664 
trust. The committee also proposed the addition of a new subsection 
"(f)" to section 664 which, in the year of distribution, would attribute 
to the trust an amount of gross income equal to the amount of the section 
642(c) deduction allowed to the estate. 
The proposed amendment to section 642(c) is premised upon a con- 
clusion by the members of the committee that a set aside deduction would 
not otherwise be available to the estate, because the possibility that the 
principal of a section 664 trust might be invaded to meet the annual pay- 
out requirement to the noncharitable beneficiary cannot be regarded as 
remote. The amendment was limited to the set aside deduction pre- 
sumably on the assumption that amounts of income actually paid to a 
section 664 trust would qualify for a section 66 1 (a) distribution deduc- 
tion if the charitable deduction under section 642(c) were not available.gl 
The committee was quite properly concerned that, if the estate were 
not allowed a set aside deduction under present law, the burden of the 
tax would fall entirely upon the charitable remainderman in the case of 
an annuity trust, and substantially upon such remainderman in the case 
of a unitrust.92 On the other hand, if the trust realized such income 
directly, no tax burden would exist to the remainderman, and the non- 
charitable beneficiary would be taxed on the income distributed to him 
by the trust pursuant to the characterization rules of Reg. 8 1.664-1 (d)(l). 
The effect of the proposed amendments, therefore, would be to shift the 
89The right of an estate to distribute amounts to a person who is a beneficiary of the trust 
and not directly of the estate is presumably based upon the desirability of avoiding un- 
necessary income commissions. 
9OTax Section Recommendation No. 1974-4, Committee on Income of Estates and Trusts, 
27 TAX LAW 834 (1974). 
glMott v. United States, 462 F.2d 512 (Ct. C1. 1972) (which denied a distribution deduction 
for income distributed to a charity which failed to meet the requirements of section 642(c)). 
But see Rev. Rul. 667,1968-2 CUM. BULL. 289. 
92The committee discussed an example involving an estate consisting of $500,000 of 8 
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burden of the income tax away from the charitable remainderman by 
allowing a set aside deduction to the estate, while preserving the character 
of the income of the estate so that the noncharitable beneficiary would be 
taxed on such income when ultimately distributed to him. The amend- 
ments would thus insure parallel tax consequences to all beneficiaries, 
whether the income was earned directly by the trust or earned and 
accumulated by the estate for future distribution to the trust. 
The  amendments would not, however, eliminate the possibility of 
differing tax consequences to the noncharitable beneficiary if the estate 
made distributions directly to such beneficiary during the deferral pe- 
riod. As previously discussed, the usual DNI rules apply to estate dis- 
tributions on a year-by-year basis, whereas the special characterization 
rules of Reg. $ 1.664-1 (d)(l) apply to trust distributions on a total ex- 
perience or throw-back basis. When planning distributions during the 
deferral period, the fiduciaries of estates and trusts should therefore give 
special consideration to the tax consequences resulting to the nonchari- 
table beneficiary if the distributions are made by the estate rather than 
by the trust. 
3. Remainder interest measurable for section 642(c) purposes despite 
the possibility that principal will be invaded. Unfortunately, the 
remedial legislation suggested by the ABA committee will not cure the 
problems faced by existing estates during the taxable years prior to the 
enactment of such legislation. Under current law, the central issue in 
determining whether a set aside deduction is available to an estate is 
whether the possibility of invading the principal of the recipient chari- 
table remainder trust for the benefit of a noncharitable interest can be 
considered so remote as to be negligible. Thus, under existing law, the 
charitable deduction is disallowed if there exists a sufficient likelihood 
that the charitable remainder interest could be defeated or limited upon 
the action of a trustee or upon the occurrence of events beyond the re- 
mainderman's power to control. As previously noted, the ABA commit- 
tee report concluded that because there was a substantial possibility that 
the annuity or unitrust amount payable would exceed the trust's annual 
income and that principal would have to be invaded to make up the 
difference, no set aside deduction would be available to an estate for 
transfers to a section 664 trust. The report did not discuss the fact, how- 
ever, that in a section 664 trust, the extent to which principal may be 
invaded is strictly limited by the statute and the regulations. 
percent corporate bonds and $300,000 of income in respect of a decedent. A residuary annuity 
trust requires the payment of 5 percent of the initial value of the trust to the noncharitable 
beneficiary, i.e., S40,OOO. If the estate accumulates the bond interest each year, an income tax 
will be paid by the estate on $340,000 which will reduce the amount distributable to the 
trust when completely funded although the trust will still be required to pay the $40,000 for 
each year of deferral undiminished by taxes paid by the estate. The estate would have to 
pay tax on only $300,000 a year if it made current distributions to the noncharitable bene- 
ficiary. 
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Although brief mention was made of the Ithaca Trust Companyg3 and 
Merchants National Bank of Bostong4 cases, the only authority discussed 
by the ABA committee in support of its conclusions and recommenda- 
tions was Revenue Ruling 66-367.95 In Revenue Ruling 66-367, a 
charitable deduction was allowed even though the trust instrument per- 
mitted invasion of the trust corpus when necessary to support the income 
beneficiary in the manner to which she had become accustomed. The 
ruling indicated that the income of the trust was more than sufficient to 
support the beneficiary in her accustomed manner. After considering 
such factors as the beneficiary's life expectancy, her past standard of 
living, and the projected trust income, the ruling held that the possibility 
that trust principal would be invaded was so remote as to be negligible. 
In Ithaca, facts similar to those in the above ruling were presented. 
The Supreme Court sustained the challenged charitable deduction on 
the grounds that the standard for invading trust principal was fixed, 
readily ascertainable, and capable of being stated in definite money terms. 
In Merchants National Bank, however, the Court denied the deduction 
because the power to invade was not limited to the beneficiary's accus- 
tomed life style, but included the beneficiary's happiness - a standard 
viewed by the Court as too uncertain and speculative to permit accurate 
measurement of the extent of future diversions from corpus. 
Since the value of the charitable remainder interest in both annuity 
trusts and unitrusts is capable of being measured with precision, section 
664 trusts are substantially different from the trusts described in the fore- 
going authorities and from almost every case or ruling decided under 
prior law. In the case of a section 664 trust, there is no necessity to com- 
pare the beneficiary's estimated needs with his other income and assets, 
or to project the amount of trust earnings. Rather, by using the Service's 
actuarial tables, a donor can readily ascertain the present value of the 
portion of his transfer in trust allowable as a charitable deduction for 
income, estate, or gift tax purposes. If the deduction can be measured, 
and is allowable to donors under sections 170, 2055, and 2522, it seems 
anomalous not to allow the estate a corresponding set aside deduction 
under section 642(c). The ABA committee, however, did not consider 
this inconsistency, even though the rules for deduction should be the 
same. The committee also failed to consider several authorities involving 
trusts more closely resembling those described in section 664 - authori- 
ties which would suggest that under current law, a section 642(c) set aside 
deduction should be available to an estate for all amounts ultimately 
payable to such trusts. 
93Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929), rev'g 64 Ct. C1.686 (1928). 
94Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 US .  256 (1943), aff'g 132 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 
1942). 
951966-2 CUM. BULL. 241. 
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Revenue Ruling 54-285,96 for example, involving facts similar to 
Ithaca and Revenue Ruling 66-367, is significant because of the language 
used to describe the circumstances in which a deduction is allowed. 
In view of the foregoing it is held that a charitable deduction for estate 
tax purposes may be allowed on account of bequests or gifts of remainder 
interests to charity in cases where the will or instrument authorized 
invasion of corpus for the comfortable maintenance and support of life 
beneficiaries if (1) there is an ascertainable standard covering comfort 
and support which may be either expressed or implied, and (2) the prob- 
ability of invasion is remote or the extent of the inuasion is calculable 
i n  accordance with some ascertainable standurd.g7 
Section 664 trusts do not permit invasion of the trust based on any stan- 
dard other than the fixed amount payable to the noncharitable bene- 
ficiary. The extent of any invasion is, therefore, much easier to calculate 
than in the Ithaca type trusts for which deductions were allowed. 
Estate of S. ~childkraut~~constitutes p rsuasive authority that a chari- 
table deduction should be permitted for any transfer in trust where the 
charitable interest is presently ascertainable, and where there is assur- 
ance that charity will actually receive such interest. In Schildkraut, the 
settlor's will created a $300,000 testamentary trust and directed the 
trustees to pay his widow $1 2,000 a year out of income or, if income was 
insufficient, out of principal. The trustees were also directed to pay all 
federal and state income taxes owed by the widow as the result of the 
trust distribution, as well as all property taxes on her Florida real estate 
as long as she owned such property. Upon the widow's death, the princi- 
pal and accumulated income, if any, vested in a qualifying charitable 
foundation. 
Reversing the decision of the Tax Court, the Second Circuit per- 
mitted an estate tax charitable deduction for the commuted value of 
the charitable remainder interest. In arriving at this result, the court 
used the tax rates as of the settlor's death as a standard for determining 
the value of the power to invade the trust assets for payment of the 
widow's tax liabilities. Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the 
widow's actual life expectancy would be materially different, the court 
approved the use of an actuarial computation of her life expectancy. The 
key assumption made in assessing the probability of invasion, however, 
was a 3% percent income rate - the rate utilized by the Service in deter- 
mining the present value of money to be received in the future.99 Noting 
961954-2 Cuxr. BULL. 302. 
S71d. at 303 (emphasis added). 
S8Estate of Sol Schildkraut v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 40 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 
U.S. 959 (1967). 
S9Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) (1958). The court also referred to the 3% percent discount 
rate utilized by the triers of fact in the second circuic in personal injury cases to compute the 
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that the case did not involve a degree of "uncertainty appreciably greater 
than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs,"lOO the court 
asserted that the many assumptions made in valuing the charitable inter- 
est were both reasonable and frequently made in other areas of the law. 
Since no qualifying section 664 trust may contain a power, no matter 
how limited, to invade principal for any purpose other than to satis5 
the required annuity or unitrust amount payable, valuation of a section 
664 trust is a much simpler task than was presented in Schildkraut. T o  
illustrate, had the trust in Schildkraut been a qualified section 664 trust, 
the court could have computed the life expectancy of the widow 
actuarially and would not have had to make any of the other assumptions. 
Moreover, the Service could not challenge the estimated income payout 
rate because, as previously mentioned, such rate is derived from tables 
issued by the Service for valuing the noncharitable and charitable re- 
mainder interests.lo1 In short, a section 664 trust presents a much strong- 
er case for permitting a charitable deduction than the facts presented in 
Schildkraut. 
Subsequent cases have been favorably influenced by the test adopted 
in Schildkraut, i.e., if the value of the charitable remainder interest is 
presently ascertainable and there is assurance that charity will receive 
such interest, a deduction will be allowed.lo2 In fitate of Judge,lo3 the 
court discussed this test and commented as follows: 
I t  should be noted that the Schildkraut case asserts that this test instead 
of the "so remote as to be negligible" test is applicable in these circum- 
stances. This court believes that the test enumerated in Schildkraut in 
effect states the underlying purpose of the remoteness test and is not in- 
consistent therewith.104 
It is noteworthy that the government's position in Estate of Judge was 
that no deduction was available because it was certain that some inva- 
sion of the corpus would occur. Presumably, this position prompted 
the members of the ABA committee to conclude that legislative amend- 
present value of money earned in the future. See generally, Conte v. Flota Mercante del 
Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 670 (2d Cir. 1960); Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 271 F.2d 524, 
527 (2d Cir. 1959). See also T.D. 7077, 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 183; Treas. Reg. 55 20.2031-10(f) 
(1970), 1.642(c)-6(d)(3) (1971) (concerning pooled income funds), 1.664-4(a)(5) (1972) (concern- 
ing unitrusts). 
10°368 F.2d at 49 (quoting from Ithaca Trust Co., 279 U.S. at 154). 
'OISee note 99 supra. 
1O2In William T .  Grant, 48 T.C. 606 (1967), (a case w h i l  did not cite Schildkraut), the 
Tax Court considered a provision requiring stock dividends having a value of 5 percent or 
less to be paid to the income beneficiary and whether a more than negligible possibility existed 
that a diversion might occur. Although the value of the original shares will decrease upon 
the issuance of stock dividends, the court concluded that the remainder interest can be com- 
puted with reasonable certainty. 
1°3Estate of Margaret D. Judge, 371 F. Supp. 716 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
lo41d. at 722 n.4. 
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ments were necessary. However, the government's position was expressly 
rejected by the court in Judge. 
The remoteness test is utilized in order to determine the likelihood 
that the charity will take and the value of what it will receive. Newton 
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 1947, 160 F.2d at 178-79. Therefore, if it 
were factually shown that the possibility of invasion of the corpus beyond 
a certain amount was so remote as to be negligible and the value of the 
charitable bequest was then determinable, the remoteness test would be 
met and a charitable deduction allowable. If it is proven that, beyond a 
certain amount of the corpus the possibility of invasion of the remaining 
portion is so remote as to be negligible, the purpose of the remoteness test 
of assuring that the amount of the charitable deduction is no greater than 
the amount which the charity does in fact eventually receive will have 
been satisfied. lo5 
Unfortunately, the taxpayer in Judge lost the deduction because the 
trust instrument contained a power to invade corpus to pay all medical, 
hospital, and nursing bills incurred by the life beneficiary. Even though 
evidence was submitted as to the amounts actually distributed from the 
trust for such purposes during the years 1967 through 1971, the court 
concluded that on the basis of the evidence presented, the maximum 
amount which would be utilized for such expenses could not be cal- 
culated with reasonable certainty. 
4. Tax consequences to the noncharitable beneficiary of the payment 
of the annuity or unitrust amount after the deferral period. The regula- 
tions require the noncharitable income beneficiary to take into his own 
income the full annuity or unitrust amount in the year in which such 
amount is paid, credited, or required to be distributed.1°6 Thus, a de- 
ferral in the payment of such amounts results in a bunching of the bene- 
ficiary's income in the taxable year in which the accumulated payments 
are made.107 
As previously discussed, the general computation of the amount pay- 
able for the deferral period includes 6 percent interest. However, since 
the obligation to pay the amount attributable to this interest is imposed 
by the federal tax law and not state law, it is not clear whether this 
amount constitutes interest income to the beneficiary within the mean- 
ing of section 61 (a)(4) or is to be taxed to the beneficiary pursuant to the 
normal characterization rules of section 664. If the 6 percent amount 
is treated as interest income, the reservoir of taxable income of the trust 
subject to the characterization rules would be unchanged, and the po- 
tential tax liability of the beneficiary would be increased. 
The  regulations under section 6 1 include as taxable interest any inter- 
lo5Zd. at 72 1. 
lo6Treas. Reg. 9 1.664-1 (d)(4)(ii) (1 972). 
lo7See note 17 supra. 
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est paid under state law with respect to overdue legacies.lO8 Interest nor- 
mally accrues in such cases if a legacy remains unpaid after the expira- 
tion of a specified period of time, e.g., 6 months. However, since few 
similarities exist between a legacy of a stated amount and the obligation 
to pay the annuity or unitrust amount, a reasonable interpretation of the 
regulations would exclude the so-called deferred interest amount from 
section 6 1 (a)(4), and treat it merely as a device for determining the total 
amount payable. Under this approach, such amount would be taxed to 
the noncharitable income beneficiary pursuant to the characteriza- 
tion rules of section 664. This view is supported by the absence of any 
interest figure in the alternative computation formula provided for 
unitrusts. Taxation of the deferred amount payable should not be de- 
pendent upon the method utilized in computing such amounts. 
5. Measurement of the section 642(c) and section 661(a) deductions. 
Even if the section 642(c) deduction is available to an estate for amounts 
paid or permanently set aside for distribution to a section 664 trust, ques- 
tions remain concerning the effect of the deduction upon the trust and 
the proper measurement of the deduction allowed to the estate. 
Although a charitable remainder trust pays no tax on income earned 
by it or attributed to it as the result of an estate distribution, the trustee 
is required to determine the tax character of all trust income and assets 
for purposes of taxing future distributions to the noncharitable bene- 
ficiary. In the case of a distribution from an estate which qualifies for 
the section 642(c) deduction, however, this task is complicated by the fact 
that such distributions are not attributed with any income character 
under the familiar DNI rules of section 662. In such cases, it only com- 
ports with common sense to treat distributions having no income char- 
acter as an item of trust c~rpus.~Og On the other hand, to the extent a 
distribution from an estate does not qualify under section 642(c) and is 
therefore subject to the distribution deduction rules of section 661 (a), the 
trust should be attributed with the receipt of various categories of in- 
come as determined pursuant to the DNI rules of section 662(b). Such 
income would pass out to the noncharitable beneficiary in future distri- 
butions from the trust according to the characterization rules of Reg. 
8 1.664- 1 (d) ( 1 )(i) previously referred to.l10 
A related question concerns the proper method for determining the 
amount of the section 642(c) deduction allowable to the estate. A logical 
- - 
108Treas. Reg. 5 l.61-7(a) (1957). 
lO9But see Treas. Reg. 5 53.4940-1(d)(2) (1972) which, for purposes of the 4 percent tax o n  
net investment income of private foundations, provides that distributions from trusts to 
private foundations do not carry over income except with respect to distributions from split 
interest trusts described in section 4947(a)(2) created after 1969 (which would include section 
664 trusts). The enforceability of the regulation has not as yet been tested. 
llOSee note 17 supra. 
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approach to the problem would be to compute the deduction on the same 
basis as for income, estate, and gift taxes. The rules for the various deduc- 
tions should be identical and should not vary merely because section 
642(c) and not section 170 or section 2055 is involved. Reg. $ 9  1.664-2(c) 
and 1.664-4 provide general rules for determining the present value of 
the remainder interest of annuity trusts and unitrusts respectively. Thus, 
where distributions to the trust are made by the estate, the amount at- 
tributable to the remainder interest would be deducted under section 
642(c), and the rest of the distribution would be deducted in accordance 
with the distribution rules of section 66 1 (a). Amounts permanently set 
aside for charity by the estate would be subject to the same apportion- 
ment. It should be noted, however, that the estate would be subject to 
tax on the amount of income apportioned to the noncharitable interest. 
Moreover, the ultimate burden of such tax would be borne by the chari- 
table remainder interest and the unfairness recognized by the ABA com- 
mittee would exist. T o  avoid this result, the executor would be required 
to distribute such amounts either to the beneficiary or to the trust. 
Apportioning amounts otherwise qualifying under section 642(c) be- 
tween the noncharitable and charitable interests and only allowing a 
deduction for the latter is a logical extension of the Schildkraut ap- 
proach. Under prior law, however, the usual approach was to deter- 
mine whether the possibility of invasion was remote and to deny or allow 
the deduction for the full amount without apportionment. In light of 
the present state of the law, there does not appear to be sufficient 
authority to sustain a deduction under this approach for the full amount 
of estate income designated for a section 664 trust. In contrast, the ap- 
proach of sections 1 70,2055, and 2522 is to divide every dollar passing to 
a section 664 trust between the noncharitable and charitable interests. 
The charitable deduction under section 642(c) should be valued on the 
same basis. 
We have only begun to perceive the problems and complexities pre- 
sented by the new forms of charitable remainder trusts described in sec- 
tion 664. While hope exists that the new statute and regulations will 
permit the development of a well-recognized, clearly defined method for 
dividing gifts between loved ones and charity, many fear that the present 
complexities in this area of the law will adversely affect charitable gift 
giving. Under these circumstances, the lawyer's responsibility to his 
client and to the public is most formidable. 
